Encyphir Risk Management
6 min read

Money Laundering: How It Works and How Forensic Accountants Investigate It

Troy Sander
Troy SanderConsultant
January 21, 2025
Money Laundering: How It Works and How Forensic Accountants Investigate It

Table of contents

The Three Stages of Money LaunderingCryptocurrency and Money LaunderingHow Forensic Accountants Investigate Money LaunderingIndicators of Money Laundering in Business ContextsCommon Typologies Encountered in Civil InvestigationsJurisdictional Complexity and Cross-Border TracingBuilding an AML Program That Withstands ScrutinyWhen Money Laundering Surfaces Inside Your Organization

Categories

Forensic AccountingCorporate Investigations

Money laundering is the process of making criminally obtained funds appear to come from a legitimate source. It is not a standalone crime. It accompanies other financial offenses, converting the proceeds of fraud, embezzlement, drug trafficking, corruption, or other criminal activity into money that can be used, invested, or transferred without revealing its origins.

The Three Stages of Money Laundering

Money laundering is typically described in three stages. Each stage is designed to increase the distance between the illicit funds and their criminal source.

Placement. This is the first and most vulnerable stage. Illicit cash or funds must enter the financial system. Common placement methods include:

  • Structuring cash deposits to avoid reporting thresholds (called "smurfing")
  • Purchasing cashier's checks or money orders
  • Commingling criminal proceeds with cash-intensive legitimate businesses
  • Using casino transactions

Placement is the stage at which law enforcement intervention is most likely. Moving large amounts of cash into the financial system creates observable transactions.

Layering. Multiple transactions are used to create distance between the funds and their source. Layering techniques include:

  • Wire transfers between accounts in multiple jurisdictions
  • Currency conversions
  • Purchases and sales of high-value assets
  • Transactions through shell companies in multiple countries

Each transaction makes the financial history of the funds more complex and harder to trace.

Integration. The laundered funds re-enter the legitimate economy, appearing as income or assets from a lawful source. Integration methods include:

  • Real estate purchases
  • Investments in legitimate businesses
  • Luxury goods
  • Loans from controlled entities that are then "repaid" with criminal proceeds

Cryptocurrency and Money Laundering

Cryptocurrency has created new mechanisms for all three stages of money laundering. Illicit proceeds can be:

  • Converted to cryptocurrency in ways that bypass traditional banking
  • Transferred across borders without formal financial institution involvement
  • Run through mixers and tumblers designed to obscure transaction histories
  • Eventually exchanged back to fiat currency

Blockchain analysis is a specialized forensic discipline. It can trace cryptocurrency transactions and, in many cases, link wallet addresses to identifiable individuals or entities. Cryptocurrency offers some anonymity advantages over traditional banking. Yet its public ledger is also a permanent and detailed record of every transaction. Forensic investigators with blockchain analysis expertise have been instrumental in high-profile cryptocurrency seizures.

How Forensic Accountants Investigate Money Laundering

Money laundering investigations require forensic accounting methodology applied to financial records across multiple entities and jurisdictions. The investigative process involves:

Transaction analysis. Forensic accountants examine bank records, wire transfers, and other financial transactions to identify the movement and conversion of funds. They look for transactions that do not make business sense, transfers to or from jurisdictions associated with financial secrecy, and patterns consistent with the placement, layering, and integration model.

Entity investigation. Investigators trace beneficial ownership of shell companies, LLCs, and offshore entities used in the scheme. Corporate filings, registered agent records, and correspondent bank records are primary sources.

Source of funds analysis. This step establishes where funds originated. It is particularly relevant when the legitimate income of the subject is inconsistent with the assets or lifestyle the money has supported.

Bank Secrecy Act compliance. For financial institutions under investigation, forensic accountants assess whether anti-money laundering (AML) compliance programs were adequate and whether SAR filing obligations were met.

Indicators of Money Laundering in Business Contexts

Organizations handling significant transactions should be alert to indicators that a counterparty may be engaged in money laundering. This is especially true in cash-intensive industries or cross-border commerce. Red flags include:

  • Unexplained urgency to complete transactions
  • Counterparties with complex ownership structures through multiple jurisdictions
  • Inconsistency between the stated nature of a business and its transaction profile
  • Reluctance to provide documentation supporting the source of funds

Common Typologies Encountered in Civil Investigations

Forensic accountants working on civil and corporate matters regularly see recurring patterns. These are known in the AML field as typologies, and they signal laundering activity even when criminal prosecution is not the objective.

Trade-based money laundering is among the most persistent. Illicit value moves across borders through over-invoiced or under-invoiced goods, phantom shipments, and manipulated commodity pricing. A sudden pattern of invoices that do not match the apparent scale of a counterparty's warehouse footprint or logistics activity is often the first visible sign.

Real estate remains a dominant integration channel, particularly in luxury markets and jurisdictions that permit anonymous LLC ownership. Familiar structures include all-cash purchases, rapid resale at artificially different valuations, and the use of nominee buyers layered behind offshore holding companies. Professional service firms sometimes encounter laundering through client trust accounts. The attorney or accountant is asked to hold funds and then disburse them under instructions that serve no evident legal purpose. Our law firm clients frequently engage us when an inbound retainer or a counterparty's payment instruction raises concerns about source of funds.

Cash-intensive businesses remain a classic placement vehicle. Car washes, laundromats, vending operators, restaurants, nightclubs, and parking operations can absorb illicit cash into daily receipts. Investigators compare declared revenue against utility usage, supply purchases, employee counts, point-of-sale data, and independently observable traffic to determine whether reported sales are plausible. A car wash reporting five times the water consumption of comparable operators becomes an immediate analytical priority. So does a restaurant whose food cost ratios cannot be reconciled with declared covers.

Jurisdictional Complexity and Cross-Border Tracing

Money laundering schemes rarely respect borders. The investigative response has to follow the funds wherever they move. Layering transactions often route through jurisdictions known for corporate secrecy, nominee directors, bearer share equivalents, or bank confidentiality regimes that resist foreign inquiry. The United States itself has become a significant destination for inbound illicit funds because of permissive state formation practices. That is why the Corporate Transparency Act and FinCEN's beneficial ownership reporting framework have reshaped the compliance landscape for domestic entities.

Cross-border tracing requires correspondent banking analysis, cooperation with foreign counsel, and careful use of mutual legal assistance treaties when criminal authorities are involved. In civil and regulatory matters, forensic accountants rely on:

  • Open-source corporate registries
  • Leaked document databases
  • Court filings from prior disputes
  • Specialized commercial databases that aggregate beneficial ownership across hundreds of jurisdictions

When a subject has used nominee shareholders or professional directors, investigators map the recurring names and addresses across filings to establish the true controlling party. This analytical work is a regular component of our due diligence engagements for investors, acquirers, and lenders who need to understand who actually sits behind a counterparty before capital moves.

Building an AML Program That Withstands Scrutiny

Businesses that fall within the scope of the Bank Secrecy Act need a written AML program that is documented and actually practiced. So do many outside it that want to manage reputational and enforcement risk. The core pillars are well established:

  • A designated compliance officer with real authority
  • A written risk assessment tailored to the institution's actual products and customer base
  • Ongoing training
  • Independent testing
  • Customer due diligence procedures that include beneficial ownership verification

Programs tend to fail in execution rather than in the written policy. Transaction monitoring systems generate alerts nobody reviews. Customer onboarding files are missing required documentation. SAR filings are delayed past the regulatory window. These are the issues that produce consent orders and civil money penalties. Independent testing should examine whether the program functions in practice, not merely whether the binder on the shelf looks complete. Our team conducts AML program reviews for financial institutions, money services businesses, real estate firms, and private investment vehicles. We provide the investigative follow-through when monitoring alerts escalate into something requiring forensic attention through our certified fraud examiner services.

When Money Laundering Surfaces Inside Your Organization

Money laundering sometimes appears not as an external threat but as conduct by an executive, trader, branch manager, or insider. The symptoms are usually indirect:

  • Unexplained wealth
  • Resistance to compliance controls
  • Unusual volume of transactions flowing through a single customer relationship
  • Override of standard onboarding procedures
  • Disproportionate entertainment of a particular client

When these signals accumulate, the appropriate response is a confidential internal investigation. It should combine forensic accounting, digital forensics, and discreet background work.

These matters require careful handling. Premature disclosure can destroy evidence, trigger litigation, or expose the organization to regulatory criticism for inadequate response. Electronic evidence often holds the most valuable material, including email, messaging applications, and financial system logs. That is why coordinated digital forensics work typically accompanies the accounting review. Where senior personnel are involved, boards and audit committees often direct the matter through outside counsel, and we support those engagements as consulting or testifying experts. For organizations confronting potential insider involvement, our work on executive misconduct investigations provides the structure needed to produce defensible findings without compromising the underlying investigation.

Our forensic accounting team investigates money laundering schemes in civil and corporate contexts, supports AML compliance assessments, and provides expert analysis for civil and regulatory proceedings involving financial crime. We also conduct background investigations on counterparties and key principals to identify prior involvement in financial crime.

Corporate clients retain us for AML program reviews, transaction-monitoring assessments, and the investigation work that follows a suspicious-activity escalation. Contact Encyphir Risk Management to discuss a financial crime investigation.